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ABSTRACT  
 
The land dispute between Bolivia and Chile has been an ongoing conflict that dates back 
to British decolonization. The War of the Pacific, which ended in 1904 and allowed 
Chilean sovereignty over land that was formerly Bolivia’s remains the root of the 
problem, as it rendered Bolivia a landlocked nation. In 2013 Bolivia filed a case with the 
International Court of Justice demanding negotiations of access to the Pacific Ocean. 
Within this land dispute, I analyzed the use of Twitter as a method of diversionary 
politics, which has been largely speculated over the years, that when presidential 
approval ratings are low in Bolivia, the land dispute is reignited as a method to divert 
attention away from other domestic conflicts, and increase public approval, also known 
as the “rally-round-the-flag” effect. By conducting a content analysis of Twitter, I was 
able to conclude that during certain periods of time, the Bolivian politicians  do use the 
dispute as a method to increase public approval, and that the Chileans remain largely 
ambivalent and unconcerned with land dispute. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
 Do politicians utilize diversionary tactics to improve their approval rating, 
especially concerning foreign policy without the threat of war? Looking at the Chile and 
Bolivia land dispute concerning the Antofagasta region, I will analyze how or if the 
territory dispute has been utilized as a political tool among elites, and if media coverage, 
specifically the use of Twitter, about the dispute has a correlation to presidential 
approval.  
 Over the last century, Chile and Bolivia have gone through periods of strained 
diplomatic relations. Almost always, Bolivia has cut diplomatic ties with Chile over 
issues regarding the Antofagasta region of Chile, which was at one time part of Bolivia. 
The loss of access to the Pacific Ocean has been detrimental to the Bolivian economy, 
even with fairly lenient trade sanctions imposed by Chile.  
 On October 1, 2018 the International Court of Justice ruled that Chile does not 
have an obligation to negotiate access to the sea with Bolivia. This ruling ended a court 
case between the two countries that lasted over 5 years, and a territorial dispute that has 
been going on for over a century. Although the court’s decision will be upheld globally, 
the Bolivian government has promised its people that they will never stop fighting for 
their sea.  
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My research question is: Do Bolivian and Chilean elites use the land dispute as a 
political tool? Other questions that I will answer are: over the last decade, how often is 
the land dispute discussed? Is there any correlation to prove that the dispute is utilized as 
a “rally tool” to boost public approval. To answer these questions, I will be analyzing the 
Twitter accounts of various Chilean and Bolivian elites and media sources.  
Twitter offers the most up-to-date information of any other media communication 
tools. In contrast to watching the nightly news on television or reading about current 
events in the morning newspaper, Twitter allows information to be shared continuously 
throughout the day almost simultaneously as the events occur. Twitter also allows for 
direct communication with your followers. It is a way to navigate away from the third-
party interviews and put your own voice and opinion out into the world. This is especially 
useful for politicians and “social media influencers” to communicate directly with their 
people, which has garnered a lot of attention in recent years, especially during election 
time periods. The newness of Twitter, however, limits the research to the time frame for 
which each user has been an active participant in the social networking site.  
To analyze the extent to which Bolivian and Chilean elites have utilized 
diversionary tactics in the modern era, I am using Twitter not only because it offers a 
unique method of direct communication, but it is also a direct reflection of the 
communication styles of prevailing governments. Each user is analyzed based on the 
frequency of tweets about the land dispute in comparison to their total volume of tweets 
and the frequency of mentioning other international interests.  
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The land dispute between Chile and Bolivia bids the perfect environment for 
analysis of the diversionary use of media within the realm of Twitter due to its saliency 
throughout the last decade and beyond.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Diversionary Politics  
 Many scholars believe that throughout the course of history of modern Bolivia, 
elites have utilized the land dispute as a political tool to boost approval ratings, and rally 
the country around a common theme, especially when other domestic issues arise. Is 
there any truth to these statements- do Bolivian or Chilean elites use the land dispute as a 
political tool?  
 The political tactic that politicians often use to divert attention away from one 
diplomatic issue to another is called “diversionary behavior.” Jack S. Levy and Lily I. 
Vakili define diversionary behavior as: “military and diplomatic actions undertaken for 
the purposes of enhancing one’s internal political support… one can make a further 
analytic distinction between two alternative mechanisms… one involves the acquisition 
through military action of tangible resources which can be used to alleviate internal 
problems… the other involves the rallying of the population around the patriotic symbols 
of the nation” (Levy and Vikili 1992). Levy’s diversionary theory of war states that 
domestic problems incentivize leaders to employ “aggressive foreign behavior” to boost 
their popularity, and “thus increase [their] chances of remaining in power” (Levy 1989). 
Or, more simply stated- diversionary behavior includes “military and diplomatic actions 
undertaken for the purposes of enhancing one’s internal political support” (Levy and 
Vakili 1992).  
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 In relation to the diversionary use of force theory, John Mueller developed a 
theory known as the “Rally-Round-the-Flag effect,” which “predicts short term boosts in 
a President’s popularity whenever there occurs an international crisis or a similar event” 
(Mueller 1970). There are two main schools of thought which can explain the rally effect: 
patriotism and opinion leadership. The patriotism explanation for the rally-round-the-flag 
effect states that during time periods of foreign policy crisis, the citizens will support the 
president as a form of patriotism, especially if the dispute threatens economic, political, 
and strategic interests (Baker and Oneal 2001), which stems from the “social identity 
theory,” in that it is inherent nature to maintain a positive view of the “group” you belong 
to (Lambert, Schott, Scherer 2011). The opinion leadership explanation for the rally-
round-the-flag effect states that because the media is so influential in the formation of 
public opinions (or presidential approval) and the fact that the president has sole access to 
the information regarding the international crisis, the media is forced to publish accounts 
from the presidential viewpoint, thus lacking open criticism of the president, which in 
turn causes a surge in approval ratings as the only information available is in support of 
the president (Baker and Oneal 2001).  
 The most effective “rally-round-the-flag effect” that has been recorded in the 
United States was sparked by the attacks of 9/11, which caused President George Bush to 
declare the War on Terrorism. “Bush’s approval rating soared in the Gallup Poll from 
51% on September 10 to 86% on September 15” (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Both 
the patriotism school of thought and the opinion leadership school of thought explain 
why the rally effect was so drastic in this example. Patriotism reasoning states that in 
times of international crisis, “the average man’s reaction will include a feeling of 
  6 
patriotism in supporting presidential actions.” The patriotism explanation is only valid in 
2% of the cases, when “the president leads the nation into a full-scale war” which as 
demonstrated by the 9/11 incident causes a sizable rally effect around the president 
(Murray 2017). The “opinion leadership” explanation states that “when a crisis happens 
suddenly, the president has a monopoly on information… this creates an unusually 
uncritical mix of news about presidential performance, and sends a signal to the public 
that the president is doing his job well” (Murray 2017).  
  The most recent scholars of the “rally-round-the-flag” phenomenon have 
concluded that the patriotism explanation and the opinion-leadership explanation are not 
mutually exclusive. “The patriotic response of the public actually helps to explain why 
opposition leaders, and even the media, refrain from criticism- they fear the public 
blowback that might result from criticisms of the president,” however this is only during 
times of full-scale war (Murray 2017).  
Are the risks of a war worth the temporary increase in popularity? Effectively, 
“manageable conflicts short of war result in small, fleeting, unreliable rallies, while 
larger-scale conflicts will provoke an initial rally but are uncontrollable and potentially 
damaging in the long term, then there is little incentive for the president to create crisis 
for political gain.” The diversionary use of force theory also requires that leaders need a 
“crisis trigger,” or a “plausible international opportunity to intentionally cause a 
diversionary conflict or risk appearing politically motivated, which would only worsen 
their political fortunes” (Murray 2017).  
On one hand, the diversionary theory of war explains why leader’s decide to 
engage in “aggressive foreign behavior” which is contingent on internal domestic issues. 
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On the other hand, the “rally-round-the-flag” phenomenon states that during time periods 
of international crisis, the president will receive a surge of public approval. Together, 
these two theories can be used to explain the incentives leaders have to engage in foreign 
conflict as a “crisis trigger” by means of diverting attention away from domestic issues, 
and in turn boost their popularity in the form of a “rally-round-the-flag” effect.  
While the majority of research regarding the “rally-round-the-flag effect” 
analyzes the United States, the same conclusions can be mirrored and interpreted in the 
Latin American counterpart. One example from the Latin American perspective is the 
case of the Falklands/Malvinas war between Argentina and Britain. In this case, many 
scholars argue that the Argentine junta forcibly seized the Malvinas as a response to 
internal public opposition which was caused by an economic crisis and human rights 
issues. They “seized the Malvinas in order to increase the domestic political support for 
their faltering military regime” (Levy and Vakili 1992). Britain responded with military 
force “in part because of expected domestic political benefits,” however it can also be 
speculated that “if Britain had not responded militarily, or if she had failed to recover the 
Falklands by force, the Argentine military junta would have remained in power for a 
considerable period” (Levy and Vakili 1992).  
The case study by Levy and Vakili concluded that the decision to invade the 
Malvinas was primarily motivated by domestic issues, and would have probably been 
successful had Britain not responded militarily as was anticipated. They also point-out 
that the conflict-cohesion literature with which the diversionary behaviors theory is based 
in, implies that “the external targets likely to be most useful in rallying the in-group 
around its political leadership are those which are perceived to threaten the in-group as a 
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whole” (Levy and Vakili 1992). This applies to the Chile-Bolivia case in that if the land 
dispute is being utilized as a diversionary tool, it would be most successful as a rally-tool 
from the Bolivian perspective due to the fact that Bolivians, as a whole, are unified in 
their disdain against Chile for rendering them landlocked, as exemplified by a survey 
originally published by La Razón in which 74% of Bolivians said they had little to no 
trust in Chile (SAP Mercurio 2006). Levy and Vakili also “hypothesize that states which 
are weak relative to society are more likely to engage in scapegoating (diversionary 
politics) than are states which are strong relative to society”. This will become evident 
later in the discussion, but could also be a reasoning as to why Bolivian politicians are 
more likely to engage in diversionary methods in comparison to Chilean politicians.  
Because many Bolivian historians and politicians have accused Evo (without 
much formal analysis) of using the land dispute as a political tool to boost his popularity 
rating, I am going to analyze the most recent case within the Chile and Bolivia land 
dispute to determine if and to what extent it has been utilized as a political tool. The 
“rally-round-the-flag” effect and the diversionary use of language can be combined to 
further analyze Twitter and the diversionary use of media explicitly regarding the land 
dispute. Specifically trying to answer the questions: Does Evo utilize the dispute as a 
diversionary tool to temporarily boost his approval rating? Does media coverage in Chile 
also correlate to public opinion of the government? 
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Hypothesis  
 I hypothesize that Bolivian politicians have utilized the land dispute against Chile 
as a diversionary tool, while on the other hand, Chile has largely remained unconcerned 
with Bolivian relations.  
 Aside from my personal experiences within both countries, there are two main 
rationales for the hypothesis I proposed: one, the claims of many scholars that Evo 
Morales utilizes the land dispute as a campaign tool, and two, how each country 
represents themselves in the media.  
 For example, Patricio Navia, a Professor of Political Science at Universidad 
Diego Portales in Chile and Liberal Studies Professor at NYU, said “Morales prefers to 
use [the land dispute] as a campaign tool because every time he finds himself in 
problems, he can point to Chile’s denial of claims for sovereign access as the reason for 
Bolivia’s underdevelopment” (Garrison 2018). Morales also has a very active media 
presence in which he discusses the land dispute almost regularly. On the other hand, 
Chile has addressed the issue, but often only in response to an antagonization by Bolivia. 
One example of this is, after Morales tweeted “Antofogasta fue, es y será territorio 
Boliviano,” (Antofagasta was, is, and will be Bolivian territory); Chilean president Piñera 
responded “El president de Bolivia se equivoca una vez más, puesto que de acuerdo al 
tratado de 1904… Antofagasta ha sido, es y va a seguir siendo chilena. Quiero también 
asegurar a mis compatriotas que este presidente va a defender con firmeza y con voluntad 
nuestra soberanía nuestro territorio, nuestro mar, y nuestra integridad territorial de 
acuerdo al derecho internacional y a los tratados vigentes.” (The president of Bolivia is 
wrong again, according to the treaty of 1904… Antofagasta has been, is, and will 
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continue to be Chilean. I want to ensure to my compadres that this president will defend 
with firmness and volition our sovereignty, our territory, our sea, and our territorial 
integrity according to international law and current treaties) (Villa 2018). At first glance, 
the media coverage from each country has their own respective strategy, which is why I 
chose to analyze Twitter by means of determining how each country has addressed the 
land dispute and if it is used as a political tool.  
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CHAPTER 3: PUTTING THE BOLIVIA-CHILE DISPUTE IN CONTEXT 
Historical Background 
 Chile and Bolivia have had an ongoing land dispute since gaining independence 
from Spain in the early nineteenth century, because boundaries within the Atacama 
Desert were never clearly identified due to the uninhabitable nature of the landscape, and 
the inconsistencies of Spanish maps which varied as to whether the territory was Bolivian 
or Chilean (St John 1994). 
 In 1866, more than forty years after independence, the border between Chile and 
Bolivia was defined as the 24th parallel under the “Treaty of Mutual Benefits.” Under this 
treaty, the land between the 23rd and 25th parallel became an equal rights zone for both 
countries (St John 1994).  
 In 1874, a new treaty between Bolivia and Chile was agreed upon, granting the 
zone between the 23rd and 25th parallels to Bolivia, but afforded low taxation for Chile. In 
1879, after Bolivia and Peru secretly allied against Chile, and after Bolivia attempted to 
raise taxes in the low taxation zone, Chilean forces occupied the Bolivian port city of 
Antofagasta. Bolivia then enlisted the help of Peru, and declared war against Chile. In 
February 1879, Chile occupied Antofagasta, and later declared war against both Bolivia 
and Peru. The Battle of Calama marks the first battle of the War of the Pacific. It 
occurred on March 23, 1879 when Bolivian forces attempted to defend the city of Calama 
against Chilean invasion, but failed following only a few hours of combat. This battle 
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exemplifies the dedication with which Bolivians fought (and will continue to fight) for 
their sea (Markham 1882).  
 “Within two months of the beginning of the conflict, the entire Bolivian littoral 
territories has been seized by Chile,” and four years later Chile officially claimed the 
northern region of Tarapacá under the 1883 Treaty of Ancón with Perú (Klein 140). In 
1884, Bolivia finally surrendered the region of Antofagasta to Chile, and both countries 
signed the Treaty of Valparaiso (Gangopadhyay 2014). This treaty was ratified in 1904 
forming the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which officially ended the war and 
recognized Chilean possession of the coast, who in return, promised to build a railroad 
from La Paz to Arica to facilitate the flow of exports and imports from the sea port to the 
Bolivian capital. The railroad was built in 1913, but was forced to close in 2005, Chile 
has since rehabilitated their section, and held a ceremony in 2013 to prove it is in 
working condition (Long 2013). The 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which 
followed what is known as the “War of the Pacific”, has stood as the principal document 
between Chile and Bolivia that outlines Chilean rights to the land that formerly belonged 
to Bolivia.  
 The next major dispute between Chile  and Bolivia came between the years of 
1952 and 1975 when diplomatic relations were severed due to use of the Lauca River. 
The Lauca River begins in Chile and empties into a Bolivian lake. The river provides 
water to many small towns in Bolivia, but when Chile attempted to divert some of the 
waters for irrigation purposes, Bolivia “protested Chilean policy… and asked the 
Organization of American States to impose sanctions on Chile” (St John 1994). Sanctions 
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were not imposed, and because Chile and Bolivia could not come to a peaceful 
agreement, diplomatic ties were severed until 1975. 
In 1975, diplomatic ties were reestablished. Bolivia, once again, requested access 
to the Pacific Ocean. Chile proposed a “land-sea corridor north of Arica along the 
Peruvian border extending to the 200 nautical mile limit for equivalent territorial 
compensation in the Bolivian Altiplano” (St John 1994). Bolivia declined, however, Peru 
responded with a proposition of a “zone of joint Bolivia-Chile-Peru sovereignty between 
the Peruvian border and the city of Arica” (St John 1994). Chile declined this idea, 
causing Bolivia to sever diplomatic relations again in 1978, which remained largely 
unstable due to governmental transitions within the region.  
The most recent land dispute between Bolivia and Chile came in 2003, when 
Bolivia planned to construct a pipeline to the ocean to transport gas. Bolivians rioted due 
to the possibility of providing Chile with Cheap gas. “The topic of [access to the sea] is a 
very simple issue in Bolivia. There is a lot of xenophobia and patriotic chauvinism. The 
military in the government always used the topic of the ocean to calm down social 
protests. People knew [the gas exportation deal] was something done by companies. But 
the fact that it was through Chile… woke up the fury of the people” (Arze 2014). The 
people rioted, causing over 80 deaths in September and October 2003, and demanded the 
more expensive option of exporting gas through Peru. While the riot can be seen as a 
nationalistic uprising, it can also represent the “injustice of… being poor in a resource-
rich land,” and the struggle of being so heavily reliant on other countries for exportation 
as a source of income (Spronk and Webber 2007). 
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During the Gas War of 2003, Evo Morales broke out into the public eye. Through 
his role as a union leader of the cocaleros (coca growers) and a founding member of the 
Moviemiento al Socialismo (MAS) political party which represented the left-indigenous 
sector of the population, Evo became heavily involved in the protests in El Alto, and 
eventually began to work closely with the president at the time, Carlos Mesa. Evo came 
to be the voice of the MAS and “entered into an unofficial alliance with the executive, 
[Mesa], that lasted from October 2003 until March 2005, ensuring the political survival 
of the president” (Webber 2010).  
In March 20015, Evo and the MAS separated from Mesa and began huge protests 
around the country, primarily over the nationalization of “hydrocarbons” which erupted 
into the second Gas War of 2005. From March 2005 until June 2005, Carlos Mesa took a 
predominately anti-Evo and anti-Indigenous stance, even naming Morales 27 times in one 
speech “in attempts to discredit him as a political leader” (Webber 2010). What began as 
political alliance between Mesa and MAS eventually turned into a toxic struggle between 
race and class.  
After Mesa’s resignation on June 5, 2005, Evo Morales and the MAS who 
represented “anticapitalist and indigenous-liberationist objectives” of the overwhelming 
“indigenous proletarian and peasant majority,” won the presidential election with 54% of 
the popular vote (Webber 2010). “He also delivered on the agenda that came out of the 
Gas Wars. On his 100th day in office, he nationalized Bolivia’s oil and gas reserves, 
sending the military to secure the fields, and giving foreign companies six months to 
comply with the new mandate or leave” (Barbassa 2019). The topic of the gas war, and 
indirectly the sea dispute with Chile, propelled Evo to popularity helping him win the 
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presidential election of 2005, and “the election of Evo Morales in 2005 inaugurated a 
new policy of conciliation on the maritime issue” (Laetitia 2013).  
  This type of long-term territory dispute is rather common in Latin America, 
largely as a result of “British decolonization in mainland Latin America, [which] is a 
persistent source of territorial disputes” (Domínguez 2003). The Bolivia-Chile dispute, 
however, is unique in the fact that after the peace treaty was signed ending the War of the 
Pacific, the dispute remained, although nonviolent, still a salient issue especially among 
Bolivians. The border dispute most resembling the dispute between Bolivia and Chile is 
the conflict between Ecuador and Peru which erupted in war in 1995 over a small strip of 
disputed territory. The key difference is that after both countries signed a treaty, the 
dispute was largely forgotten. “On October 30, 2014, Ecuadorian Ambassador to Peru 
José Sandoval noted that the countries were in their ‘best moment’ of bilateral relations” 
(Bons 2015).  
Another example of a tense, yet nonviolent dispute is the “Beagle Conflict” 
between Chile and Argentina. The dispute stemmed from discrepancies regarding 
boundary lines in the Beagle Channel that dated back to decolonization. Although it came 
close to war, a compromise aided by the Papacy prevented any violent outbursts. Both 
countries were content with the results of the compromise, and while some mistrust still 
remains between the nations, “the treaty now provides a base for confidence-building 
measures that was not there before” (Garrett 1985), allowing both Chile and Argentina to 
move forward.  
In summary, the land dispute between Bolivia and Chile has been problematic 
since the War of the Pacific. This type of long-standing, largely nonviolent dispute is 
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common in Latin America due to long-term effects of British decolonization, however, 
the Chile-Bolivia case is unique in that it still remains a prominent issue 115 years after 
the peace treaty was signed.  
 
The Political Environment in Bolivia   
Evo Morales has been the president of Bolivia since 2006, when he was elected 
with an overall majority of 54%, as the first indigenous president. As discussed earlier, he 
represents the political party MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo, or the Movement towards 
Socialism. During this time period, Bolivia operated under an electoral system known as 
“’parlimentarized presidentialism’. In this system, Bolivian presidents (unless they could 
muster an absolute majority of the popular vote, as only Evo Morales did in December 
2005) were elected through multiparty legislative coalitions” (Centellas 2009). Meaning 
that the National Congress selected a president “from among the top two runners-up” 
(Centellas 2009).  
In 2009, Bolivia approved a new constitution that was drafted under the 
government of Evo Morales. While the governmental structure of a “presidential system 
with a bicameral legislature” remained the same, the new constitution provided many 
other structural changes. For example, the structure of the electoral system was changed. 
Unlike before, the governmental representatives are elected directly by the people, and if 
no candidate received 50% of the popular vote, there is a second round of votes between 
the top two candidates, however the President can be elected if he wins “the first round 
with 40% of the vote [and] provided that they have at least a ten point lead over the 
nearest rival” (Alpert, Centellas, Singer 2010). With this amendment also came term 
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limits, allowing the president to be consecutively re-elected one time, however the 
election in December 2009 essentially started with a clean slate. This means that although 
it was technically Evo’s second term as president, under the 2009 Constitution it would 
be considered his first term, and thus he was available for re-election in 2015.  
A key addition to the new constitution is chapter four, “Reivindicación Marítima” 
(Maritime Recognition). Article 267 states:  
El Estado boliviano declara su derecho irrenunciable e imprescriptible 
sobre el territorio que le dé acceso al océano Pacífico y su espacio 
marítimo. La solución efectiva al diferendo marítimo a través de medios 
pacíficos y el ejercicio pleno de la soberanía sobre dicho territorio 
constituyen objetivos permanentes e irrenunciables del Estado Boliviano. 
(The state of Bolivia declares its indispensable and irreversible right over 
the territories that give it access to the Pacific Ocean and its maritime 
space. The effective solution to the maritime problem is to be carried out 
by peaceful means and the exercise of sovereignty over said territory, 
constitutes permanent objectives and indispensable ones of the Bolivian 
State.)  
It is clear that Evo Morales is not only utilizing the issue of the sea as a campaign tool, 
but he even included it in his new constitution so as to make it a more prominent issue. 
“Bolivia is a paradigmatic example of the role of geography in the construction of a 
collective identity…The maritime claim, the quest to regain a coastline, structures 
Bolivians’ national imagination and provides a basis for nation-building” (Laetitia 2013). 
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Through the addition of this section, Evo and the government of Bolivia are appealing to 
the rhetoric of the people and the national identity of what it means to be “Bolivian.”  
 Evo was elected President in the election of 2009 that followed the release of the 
Constitution, and he was reelected again in 2014. In 2016, Bolivia held a referendum to 
vote whether or not to amend the constitution to allow Morales to  run for a fourth 
presidential term. Despite the country voting against Morales, he is now  attempting to 
defy the referendum and run again for presidency in 2019.  Morales appealed to the 
judges that he appointed to reverse the results of the referendum citing that it is a 
“fundamental human right” to be able to run for election. His judges reversed the 
referendum, and Morales will be allowed to run again in 2019, contradicting the laws of 
the constitution that he himself put into place (Toro 2019). 
 In order to understand the key differences between Evo Morales as the president 
of Bolivia and his Chilean counterparts, it is essential to understand the type of leader that 
Evo is. Evo symbolizes what it means to be a contemporary populist leader in Latin 
America. While populism is extremely hard to define, it can be understood as “a set of 
ideas about how politics should function… [It] is a thin-centered ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups ‘the pure 
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression 
of the general will of the people” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Evo has introduced 
policies that promote inclusion of the poor, a stronger educational system, and even 
improvement of old-age pensions and disability, all the while, (possibly unintentionally) 
excluding certain social groups, such as the wealthy in Santa Cruz (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2013). “Radical democracy is the type of political order that best represents 
  19 
the aspiration of contemporary populist leaders in Latin America” (de la Torre 2010). We 
see this type of ‘radical democracy’ in the new constitution of 2009 which promoted new 
and direct methods of political participation. The final populist phenomenon that Evo 
exemplifies is called “symbolic dimension,” meaning that the populist leaders create a 
boundary between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’- the characteristics of ‘the elite’ are 
excluded from the symbolic definitions of ‘the people’. Evo embodies this through his 
dress and actions which mirrors that of “ordinary people,” and by “developing an anti-
elitist discourse” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013).  
 In summary, Evo Morales, the representation of a contemporary “Latin American 
populist”, has sculpted Bolivian politics since he entered the scene in the early 2000s. He 
has reigned as President of The Plurinational State of Bolivia for 14 years, and with the 
upcoming election he will try extend his sovereignty for 5 more years.  
 
The Political Environment in Chile  
 The current political environment in Chile is a direct consequence of the long-
time reign of the conservative dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet who was voted out of 
office only 29 years ago, and was replaced by the center-left coalition that reestablished 
democracy (Forero 2009). Pinochet implemented the current constitution in 1980, which 
has since been amended. The most famous amendment is the implementation of the 
binomial system in the Senate. “Under the system, each coalition can present two 
candidates for the two Senate and two lower-chamber seats apportioned to each 
chamber’s electoral districts. Only if the leading coalition ticket outpolls the second-place 
coalition by a margin of more than 2-to-1 does the winning coalition gain both seats” 
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(ThisisChile, Government and state of Chile). The binomial system is unique to Chile, as 
it is designed to promote bipartisanship, and it “increases incentives for coalition 
formation and maintenance” (Siavelis 1997).   
 The country operates as a “democratic state with a presidential republican 
system.” The president, however, is limited to only one, four-year term. The president 
can be re-elected, but the constitution does not allow consecutive terms. Michelle 
Bachelet who represents the Socialist Party of Chile, was President from 2006-2010 and 
again in 2014-2018. Although her ideals are more aligned with the leftist ideals of 
Bolivia, she agreed to open dialog with Bolivia, yet she never wavered from the Chilean 
viewpoint that the Treaty of 1904 was impossible to change, and that the sea did not 
belong to Bolivia (Laetitia 2013).  
 On the opposite side of the political spectrum is the current Chilean President, 
Sebastian Piñera who represents the right-wing “Chile Vamos” coalition. When he was 
first elected in 2010, Piñera was the first elected conservative president since the 
dictatorship of Pinochet. He is one of the wealthiest business men in Chile, and as such, 
he promised to “turn his business acumen to the country’s economic growth” (BBC 
News, Profile: Chile’s President Sebastian Piñera). Not only does Piñera characterize 
opposing political viewpoints of the leftist ideals of both Bachelet and Evo, he also 
embodies the exact opposite personality and leadership characteristics of Evo.  
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Comparing the State Powers  
 Both Bolivia and Chile run democratic-republic structured governments. 
Although some of the details may differ, this is the general structure of the governments 
within modern day Latin America. (White 1999).  
 Chile is a much stronger country in basic terms of international and domestic 
power. Chile has consistently had a higher GDP, larger population, lower poverty rates, 
higher human development index (which is a measure of how developed the country is), 
and greater military expenditure. In 2017, Chile’s GDP was $277.076 billion (USD), their 
population was 18,054,726, the poverty ratio was 8.6% of the population at or below the 
poverty line, human development index of .843, and military expenditure in of 
$5,135,493,827 (USD) or 1.91% of GDP. Bolivia’s GDP was $37.509 billion (USD), 
their population was 11,051,600, the poverty ratio was 39.5% of the population at or 
below the poverty line, human development index of .693, and military expenditure of 
$656,750,459 (USD) or 1.76% of GDP. Chile not only has more “man-power” in terms 
of population, but they also have a significantly higher GDP which means they have 
more purchasing power than Bolivia. Chile can “afford” to ignore the demands from 
Bolivia because their economy is not being damaged by the loss of the Litoral, as 
Bolivia’s is. In terms of military expenditure, Chile spends almost eight times the amount 
of Bolivia, implying that Bolivia does not have the resources to even consider a war 
against Chile (Worldbank). 
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The Importance of the “Mar”   
 “Since the War of the Pacific… governments, social movements, and political 
groups have all relied on this sense of collective injury to build resource nationalist 
frames. The lack of seacoast is reinforced in the social imagery every year on the Day of 
the Sea” (Kohl and Farthing 2012). The Day of the Sea is celebrated annually on March 
23, which commemorates the first battle of the War of the Pacific, and honors the war 
hero Eduardo Abaroa who was courageously killed in this battle as he refused to 
backdown against the Chilean forces.  
The holiday not only commemorates the loss of the sea, but it is also serves as a 
reminder to the public they cannot and will not stop fighting for their sea. Some of the 
celebrations include: offering flowers to the statue of Eduardo Abaroa, the raising of 
flags, lighting the votive flames, a song to Abaroa, a moment of silence accompanied by 
a 21 gun salute, singing of the “Anthem of the Sea,” (which lists cities that Bolivia hopes 
to regain), a message from the president, and finally a military march towards the ocean. 
(Alanoca 2018). The purpose of the parades and speeches is to remind the public that “It 
is the duty of all Bolivians to claim the right to the sea” (Kohl and Farthing 2012). The 
Day of the Sea celebrations are celebrated in every major city in Bolivia, as it is a 
national issue that effects every Bolivian.  
 In 2014, the Bolivian government published El Libro del Mar (The Book of the 
Sea). The book discusses the history of the loss of the Littoral, the Chilean attempts at 
negotiating sovereign access to the sea, Bolivia’s claim in the international court, and the 
consequences of being landlocked. The government distributed the book and made it a 
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required read in all primary and secondary schools (Bolivia pone el Libro del Mar como 
lectura obligatoria en colegios).  
 El Libro del Mar outlines the history of the dispute, but most importantly it gives 
several arguments as to why Bolivia is suffering as a consequence of being landlocked. 
Bolivia lost access to several profitable natural resources including: guano, saltpeter, 
silver, copper (which is the backbone of the Chilean economy), lithium, and other 
maritime resources. There is also an excessive cost imposed by extra transportation to 
and from the Chilean and Peruvian ports, not to mention extra fees for inspection, 
services, and storing. Along with other economic limitations placed on Bolivia such as 
income level, limitations on foreign investments, and limitations on continuous 
development. The book states that “Most landlocked states are among the poorest 
countries of their regions… In 2010, for instance, Coastal States had an average GDP per 
capita of 66% higher compared to Landlocked States” (El Libro del Mar, 89). It also 
claims that “landlocked states receive a minuscule percentage of foreign investment.” 
And finally, Bolivia’s human development index has been increasing due to social 
improvements, but the lack of access to the sea has limited its economic growth, and 
therefore hindered its HDI from reaching its full potential.  
 Bolivia even maintains a navy with the mission of “Employing navy power for 
security and defense, administration and protection for the maritime interests, river, lakes, 
and the marine merchant” (Miranda 2018). Many scholars view the Bolivian Navy as a 
symbol for never giving up their quest for access of the sea. 
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Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) 
 There were many internal and external factors that culminated in Bolivia’s official 
institute of proceedings against Chile in 2013. One of the first external influences was in 
2008 when Peru filed against Chile in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding 
their maritime borders in the Pacific. “Bolivia interpreted this as a threat because the 
decision of the court could legally reinforce its loss of the sea,” this lead Evo to initially 
contact the Hague as a reminder that Bolivia must be considered in any agreement 
between Peru and Chile (Laetitia 2013). With this, it is important to understand that 
“Bolivia’s international identity is directly linked to its national identity, and that 
nationalism is reactivated in accordance with political contexts” (Laetitia 2013).  
 In 2010, Evo faced his largest political crisis which resulted in mass 
demonstrations all over the country, and it forced the government to reinstate state 
subsidies of gasoline, (a common theme in the history of Bolivia). Also in 2010, one of 
the largest national trade unions in Bolivia launched a massive strike against the 
government as a form of demand for the increase in minimum wage.  
 The combination of Peru putting pressure on Bolivia from the outside and the 
internal turmoil that had forced earlier presidents in similar situations to resign, Evo was 
forced to refocus the attention of his people and ease the political tension. “The campaign 
to recover the coastline was undoubtedly the most fertile means for winning back the 
popular support… It put Bolivia’s national interest back at the center of political debate 
by focusing on the shared desire to reclaim access to the sea” (Laetitia 2013). As a 
strategic response to the political crisis that arose during 2010, Evo responded on March 
23, 2011 at the Dia del Mar celebrations when he announced his intent to “appeal to 
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international organizations and tribunals to regain its maritime sovereignty” (Laetitia 
2013). In April 2011, Evo created the Strategic Unit for Maritime Demands (Dirección 
Estratégica de Reinvindicación Marítima- DIREMAR), who’s primary goal was to 
“coordinate actions to achieve access to the sea for Bolivia in national and international 
forums” (Kohl and Farthing 2012).  
 Two years later, on April 23, 2013 Evo Morales made a statement to NPR’s South 
American correspondent, Lourdes Garcia-Navarro stating that “Bolivia has never shut 
itself off from dialogue with Chile. Chile, on the other hand, has been contrary and 
obstructive,” and another Bolivian official said “Bolivia’s hand has been forced, and it 
has no choice by to take its case to the international court” (Garcia-Navarro 2013).  
 Finally, on April 24, 2013, Bolivia officially filed a case with the International 
Court of Justice under the terms that “Chile [has the] obligation to negotiate in good faith 
and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully 
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” (International Court of Justice, Press Release, 
04/24/2013). The case took over five years to deliberate, but on October 1, 2018 the 
Hague voted that Chile does not have the obligation to negotiate access to the sea with 
Bolivia (Redacción, BBC News Mundo, 10/01/2018).  
Bolivia filed with the ICJ in 2013 with three contentions against Chile, “(1) Chile 
has an obligation to negotiate an agreement granting Bolivia sovereign access to the 
Pacific Ocean; (2) Chile breached that obligation, and therefore (3) Chile must perform 
this obligation promptly, and in good faith” (Kleiman 2016). Although Chile tried to 
argue that the ICJ does not have the jurisdiction over the Antofagasta dispute due to the 
fact that the 1904 Peace Treaty was the governing body of this dispute, the ICJ objected 
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this notion on the preface that “the subject matter of the dispute was whether Chile is 
obligated to negotiate Bolivia’s access to the Pacific, and in the case there is an 
obligation, whether it is breached” (Kleiman 2016). The implications of the court ruling 
in favor of either country expands far beyond the scope of just this dispute, it can have 
effects on international precedents and the strength of the ICJ. 
Although the discussion of whether or not Chile has the obligation to negotiate 
with Bolivia has technically ended with the court’s decision, I believe Bolivian 
politicians will continue to use the land dispute as a political strategy. Additionally, the 
implications of this ruling will reach far beyond the scope of Chile and Bolivia. “One 
problem that could arise from this holding is that it could devalue the words and actions 
of governmental authorities” (Kleiman 2016). The economic implications are not 
detrimental for either country because the agreements that are already in place will 
remain, but it could mitigate further economic development in Bolivia as they claim to be 
significantly hindered by their lack of littoral.   
As this lengthy land dispute reached another critical deciding point, it is important 
to analyze how Chile and Bolivia have utilized the Antofagasta region as a method of 
gaining public approval or diverting attention away from a different issue. While Chile 
does not necessarily utilize the dispute as a political tool, it has often responded to 
accusations by the Bolivian government causing the dispute to be a topic of conversation. 
On the other hand, while Bolivia might have a legitimate economic concern for engaging 
in the land dispute, (just as any other state who engages in diversionary politics has 
legitimate concerns), it does not diminish the fact that the dispute is also utilized as a 
political tactic to garner public approval.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
Why Twitter  
Twitter is a social media, micro-blog, that allows its users to “tweet,” or post, 
thoughts, opinions, jokes, pictures, videos, links, polls, and more as long as it is within 
the 280-character limit. It has been frequently employed as a method of efficient and 
effect communication over the past decade, and it has continued to grow in popularity. I 
chose to analyze the Twitter feeds of both politicians and newspapers for various reasons. 
Twitter is a direct reflection of one’s thoughts and opinions, and is much less formal than 
a scheduled press-conference. Politicians often use Twitter to inform their followers of 
current events, and express their thoughts and opinions. Along with informing their 
followers about current events, Newspapers also utilize twitter as a form of publicity to 
encourage followers to access their articles through a direct link and short description. 
The growth of the internet and social networking sites have grown to be 
influential both in communication and in perception. Yonghwan Kim writes that “Social 
network sites (e.g. Facebook and MySpace) have been used by campaign managers and 
ordinary citizens both as sources of information and as tools to broaden their campaign 
and viewpoints” (Kim 2011). Since 2011, MySpace is no longer relevant, but has been 
replaced by others such as Instagram and Twitter. Social networking sites are not only 
useful in providing information, but also as a means of expressing opinions and receiving 
opposing viewpoints. “Twitter is both a social network and a broadcast medium. It is 
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certainly used by news organizations, politicians, celebrities, and corporations to 
broadcast messages, but it is also used by normal people engaging in activities” (Steinert, 
89). Specifically, in political science it has been used to research conflict dynamics and 
public opinion (72). I used twitter to analyze the conflict dynamics regarding the land 
dispute between Chile and Bolivia and compare it to the public opinion of presidential 
approval. 
As a contemporary Latin American Populist, Evo is more prone to using various 
outlets in order to communicate with his people. “Populists use multiple channels of 
political communication to transmit their messages and connect with their publics. In 
contemporary societies, where all politics is mediatized at some level, it is inevitable that 
populist figures will use the media… [some] focus on forms of direct (e.g., grassroots, 
community engagement) political communication, through which populists connect, 
construct, and reconstruct their publics” (Block and Negrine 2017). The Twitter platform 
allows for direct communication and “personal” connection between Evo and his 
followers. On a fundamental level, Evo as a populist uses Twitter as a method of mass 
and direct interaction to maintain his “closeness” with his people.  
 
Scraping the Tweets  
 According to the Techopedia, web scraping “is a term for various methods used to 
collect information from across the internet… [it] is essentially a form of data mining”. 
So, in order to get the data from Twitter, I had to “scrape” the Tweets to make them 
useable data.  
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It is important to note that Twitter has an API limit of only allowing 
downloadable access to the most recent 3,200 tweets per user. To get around this 
limitation, I used Twitter’s “advanced search” function to search for tweets from a 
specific user and by restricting the time frame, I was able to access older tweets. I then 
scraped the old tweets with a Google Chrome plug-in, DataMiner, which allowed me to 
use a public recipe to scrape and then convert the tweets into an Excel file.  
I conducted a content analysis of Twitter feeds from Chilean and Bolivian 
newspapers, and major political figures from both countries. From Chile, I utilized  the 
twitter feeds of Michele Bachelet and Sebastian Piñera, and the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs since 2014 (because prior ministers do not have Twitter accounts). Heraldo 
Muñoz (2014-2018) and Roberto Ampuero (current), along with the official Twitter 
account of the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  I also used accounts from popular 
newspapers including La Tercera and El Mercurio, which are two of the largest national 
newspapers in Chile. Due to Twitter’s API limitations, I chose El Mercurio as my 
primary Chilean media source to scrape beyond the allotted 3,200 tweets. I downloaded 
El Mercurio’s tweets dating back to January 2017 through January 2019.  
From Bolivia, I analyzed the twitter feeds of Evo Morales and Carlos Mesa, along 
with the Chancellors of Bolivia since 2017: Fernando Huanacuni Mamani, Diego Pary 
Rodriguez, and the official account of Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  I also looked 
at Bolivian newspapers including Pagina Siete, La Razón, and El Deber. Pagina Siete is a 
local newspaper from La Paz which primarily focuses on politics and economics from an 
independent perspective. La Razón is also published in La Paz, but it tends to be pro-
government, while El Deber is a regionalist newspaper published in Santa Cruz. Due to 
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the large volume of tweets from the newspaper accounts, I chose to manually scrape 
tweets dating from January 2017 until January 2019 for Pagina Siete.  
For Evo Morales, I downloaded all of his tweets, dating back to April 2016, when 
he created his account, through January 31, 2019. I also scraped all of Carlos Mesa’s 
tweets from 2014 through 2019, along with all of the tweets from the Chilean and 
Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accounts. For the rest of the accounts, the allotted 
3,200 tweets per user were sufficient.  
 
Codification  
 After scraping the tweets, I cleaned and filtered the data. I then coded all of the 
tweets based on relevance of discussion about the land dispute. The words I utilized to 
filter and then ultimately code were: el mar (sear), Bolivia, Chile, la haya (the Hague), 
Evo Morales, fallo (Verdict), Litoral (how Bolivian’s refer to the territory that was ceded 
by Chile), Piñera, Bacchelete, Antofagasta, Pacifíco (Pacific), oceano (ocean), tratado 
(treaty), conflicto marítimo (maritime conflict), salida (exit), la CIJ (the International 
Court of Justice), soberanía (sovereignty), la corte (the court), and frontera (border). After 
filtering the tweets, I read all of the tweets to ensure significance, and coded the 
significant tweets as 1.  
 Some examples of tweets that I coded as significant because they discuss the land 
dispute are as follows:  
From @evoespueblo (Evo Morales) on October 20, 2018: “Como hoy, hace 114 años, 
Chile impuso por la fuerza de las armas el Tratado de 1904, después de invadir en 1879 el 
puerto boliviano de Antofagasta. La CIJ falló que ese tratado no resolvió la cuestión de 
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nuestro acceso soberano al mar y que debe resolverse a través del diálogo.” (114 years 
ago today, Chile imposed the Treaty of 1904 by the force of arms, after they invaded the 
Bolivian port of Antofagasta in 1879. The ICJ ruled that this treaty did not resolve the 
question of our sovereign Access to the sea and that it should be resolved through 
dialogue.) And, on March 23, 2017: “Hoy #Bolivia recuerda 138 años de la primera 
resistencia a la agresión e invasión de #Chile a nuestro territorio.  
#MarParaBolivia” (Today, Bolivia remembers 138 years since the first resistance to the 
aggression and invasion of Chile to our territory #SeaForBolivia).  
From @sebastianpinera (Sebastian Piñera) on October 2, 2018: “Celebramos en 
Antofagasta histórico y justo triunfo de Chile en La Haya. Agradezco a ex Pdtes su 
valioso consejo y experiencia. Todos defendimos nuestra soberanía con compromiso y 
unidad. Esperamos q  Bolivia acate fallo y respete Tratado 1904 para abrir las puertas del 
diálogo.” (We celebrate in Antofagasta a historical and just triumph of Chile in the 
Hague. I thank former presidents for their valuable advice and experience. We defended 
our sovereignty with commitment and unity. We hope that Bolivia accepts failure and 
respects the Treaty of 1904 to open the doors of dialogue). And, on May 10, 2017 “Pte 
Morales: los límites entre Chile y Bolivia quedaron fijados en Tratado 1904.Chile 
defenderá siempre su soberanía y no debe nada a Bolivia” (President Morales: the 
boundaries between Chile and Bolivia were fixed in the Treaty of 1904. Chile will always 
defend its sovereignty and owes nothing to Bolivia).  
An example of an irrelevant tweet is by @mbachelet (Michelle Bachelet): “En Chile, 
usamos 3.400 millones de bolsas plásticas al año. Muchas terminan contaminando el mar. 
Cuidar el medio ambiente es tarea de todos.” (In Chile, we use 3.4 million plastic bags a 
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year. Many end up polluting the sea. Caring for the environment is everybody’s job)- this 
tweet would have been initially filtered by the term “sea,” but after reading, it is evident 
that it does not relate to the land dispute with Bolivia, and therefore it is irrelevant.  
 All of the tweets were also coded based on month of the “Day of the Sea.” If the 
tweet was published in the month of March, it was coded 1. Any other month was coded 
0. The month of the “Day of the Sea” is useful in analyzing the time frames in which the 
dispute is most frequently mentioned.  
To normalize the data, for each month, the number of relevant tweets were 
divided by the total number of tweets for that month to get the percentage of relevant 
tweets per month. The percent of relevant tweets per month per user is completely 
independent of the “Day of the Sea” variable.  
 
Methodology  
The next step was to compare the Twitter data with presidential approval over 
time. The presidential popularity data for Chile and Bolivia comes from aggregate 
monthly polling data from the Executive Approval Project’s Database. The twitter data 
and the popularity ratings were reorganized into panel data format, so that each user’s 
percent of relevant tweets per month had corresponding popularity data for both Chile 
and Bolivia during that month.  
Two types of linear regressions were run to determine if the percent of relevant 
tweets is correlated to the presidential approval rating, and therefore can lead to a 
conclusion as to whether or not the land dispute is utilized as a political tool to boost 
public approval ratings.  
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First, a bivariate linear regression was run correlating the percent of relevant 
tweets to the presidential approval rating. For these manipulations, the dependent variable 
was the percent of relevant tweets, and the independent variable was the presidential 
approval rating. For example, I am trying to determine if public approval is down at a 
certain time period, does a politician increase tweets about the land dispute as an attempt 
to divert attention away from his internal “failures” and therefore, improve his rating. 
This was done for the Twitter accounts for both countries. The Chilean accounts were 
correlated to both the Chilean approval rating, and then the Bolivian approval rating to 
determine if either had an effect on the frequency of tweets about the land dispute; the 
same was done for the Bolivian accounts.  
Next, another bivariate linear regression was run to correlate the percent of 
relevant tweets to the month of the “Day of the Sea.” In this case, the independent 
variable was the month of March, in order to determine if the frequency of tweets 
regarding the land dispute had any correlation to the month in which Bolivian’s 
celebrated the history of their sea. This was done for both countries to determine if a 
Bolivian holiday has any effect on Chilean coverage of the dispute, meaning that it is 
effects more than just Bolivia itself.  
Finally, a multivariate linear regression for Bolivia was run to determine if the 
approval rating of the Bolivian president during the month of the “Day of the Sea” had 
any effect on the frequency of tweets about the land dispute. The percent of relevant 
tweets was still the dependent variable, but now the two independent variables were the 
presidential approval rating and the month of the “Day of the Sea.” With this correlation, 
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I was trying to determine if Evo’s approval rating, conditioned specifically during the 
month of March, had any correlation to the amount of tweets regarding the dispute.  
All of the linear regressions were performed using Stata software (statistical 
software for data science), which were run using the xtregar command. The xtregar 
command “fits cross-section time-series regression models when the disturbance term is 
first-order autoregressive” (stata.com), which is also known as an AR(1) error. Meaning 
that all of the linear regressions were performed with the AR(1) correction, which weighs 
each variable so that the “error term” which is the time series bias, does not correlate over 
time.  
What this means is that, the AR1 correction adjusts for the bias in a time series 
that yesterday’s actions are correlated, via time, to today’s actions. The correction 
removes the autocorrelation for one month back, so that over time, the correlations are 
unique and are not subject to the time series bias. For instance, if November is the month 
being tested, all of the correlations with October are removed to produce unique 
observations for the month of November that were not affected by the time series bias. 
All linear regressions have the assumption of independent errors, meaning that there 
should be no autocorrelation in the data. This is especially important for a time series, 
because if the data is not corrected (i.e. by the AR(1) correction), the consecutive errors 
will become dependent on each other and skew the data based on the lack of 
independence. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS 
A side-by-side Comparison  
 Overall, the Bolivian elites tweeted about the land dispute more frequently than 
the Chilean elites. On average, all of the Chilean accounts only tweeted about the land 
dispute 2% of the time between March 2009 and December 2018. Comparatively, on 
average, 7% of the tweets from the Bolivian accounts between September 2012 and 
January 2019 were regarding the land dispute. Therefore, during this period, the Bolivian 
accounts tweeted about the land dispute, on average about 350% more than the Chileans. 
I found this by taking the overall average of the percentage of relevant tweets from the 
Chilean accounts and from the Bolivian accounts.  
 Both the Chilean and Bolivian presidential approval ratings go through a series of 
peaks and troughs which coincides with the cyclical approval model which states that, 
“post-election honeymoon highs gradually deteriorate before recovering slightly at the 
end of the term” (Carlin, Hartlyn, Hellwig, Love, Martínez-Gallardo and Singer 2018, 1). 
Figure 1 compares the Bolivian and Chilean presidential approval ratings, and it also 
marks relevant election time periods to show the cyclical model. Chilean approval rating 
peaked at 77 and went as low as 21 creating a range of 56 percentage points with the 
average rating at 35, and a standard deviation of 11.5.  Bolivian approval rating peaked at 
71 and it bottomed-out at 29, which created a range of 41 percentage points with an 
average of 49 and standard deviation of 10.3.  
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The Chilean approval rating varies more widely from the mean than does 
Bolivia’s, which can be explained by the swings that election time periods create in 
Chile. In 2010, 2014, and 2018 Chile elected a new president. Each presidency is marked 
by “honeymoon highs” at the beginning of the term, followed by a gradual decline over 
the next four years, and then a slight increase as the president ends his term and reminds 
the citizens of what he/she has done for the country throughout his reign by fulfilling his 
campaign promises.  
Evo’s approval rating is also marked by these “honeymoon highs,” when he was 
reelected in 2009 and 2014. They are not as drastic of upswings and downswings as we 
see in Chile because it is not a new presidential candidate, instead Evo is campaigning for 
reelection.  
Noting the highs and lows and the differences between countries helps us to better 
understand the dynamic in each country. Overall, it seems Bolivia is generally more 
satisfied with their leadership possibly due to the stability that Evo created under the 
Movimiento al Socialismo. On the other hand, it seems that Chile is more critical of their 
government, possibly because they are still recovering from the mistrust that the 
dictatorship caused less than thirty years ago. Additionally, looking at the approval 
ratings over time for each country gives a basis for how much change is to be expected. 
For example, Evo’s lowest approval ratings occurred in November 2016, after he lost the 
referendum to run for his fourth consecutive term. In March of the following year is when 
we see the largest amounts of tweets dedicated to the land dispute.  
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Figure 2 focuses on Chile, and despite the cycle of high and low rates of approval 
which coincide with Presidential elections, there seems to be almost no correlation 
between the frequency of tweets about the land dispute and the presidential approval 
rating. It is applicable to notice that the peaks of relevant tweets occurred a certain time 
frames, whether it was an important date for the court case, the Bolivian “Day of the 
Sea”, and the Chilean “Navy Day.” 
A similar analysis can be given for Figure 3 for Bolivia. It appears that minor 
increases in approval rating may coincide with an increase of tweets about the land 
dispute, but what is more relevant to notice is that the percentage of tweets peak, again, 
around specific dates, either for the court case and the Bolivian “Day of the Sea.”  
 
The Bolivian Perspective  
 Figure 4 explicitly shows the time periods (in red) that coincided with press 
releases from the International Court of Justice. In April 2013, Bolivia officially filed 
against Chile, which caused the amount of tweets about the land dispute to almost double 
from the month before. The next major increase in tweets is in May 2015 when the 
Courts held public hearings “on the Preliminary Objection raised by the Republic of 
Chile,” and the amount of tweets tripled that of the two preceding months. 
 The largest amount of tweets that Bolivians have dedicated to discussing the land 
dispute was in March 2017. This date did not directly coincide with an ICJ press release, 
however, it was an important date for Bolivia within the trial because it is when Bolivia 
submitted a written reply to Chile in the court. The delivery of the letter to the court in 
the Hague became part of the celebration of “Día del Mar,” the Bolivians in La Paz held 
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an indigenous ceremony in front of the government palace, and as this ceremony was 
going on, there was a screen which projected the delivering by Bolivian delegates of their 
reply to the court.   This special ceremony coincided shortly after Evo’s lowest approval 
ratings, and his lowest approval ratings in the month of March. The trend in previous 
years was for Evo’s approval ratings to temporarily increase in March, and then drop 
back down in April.  In 2017, however, Evo was trying to recover from his lowest ever 
approval ratings, and he utilized the “Day of the Sea” celebrations to highlight a crucial 
moment of the court case. The following months showed a steady incline in Evo’s 
approval ratings.  
In March of 2018, the court again conducted public hearings, and Bolivians began 
to tweet considerably more about the land dispute. At this point, Evo’s approval ratings 
had begun to drop back down again, so the key moments of the court case during the 
month of the “Day of the Sea” culminated in an influx of tweets about the land dispute. In 
September 2018, the ICJ said they will deliver their judgement on October 1, 2018, 
therefore the dispute is mentioned in tweets from the Bolivians about 30% of the time 
during September and October, but then drastically drops off in November when Chile 
won the court case. 
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Figure 4: (red dots represent tweets during important case dates of the court case) 
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The panel regression analysis for Bolivian Twitter feeds provide more accurate 
information regarding political usage of the tweets, and it also relates to the timing of the 
tweets as previously discussed. 1 The regression shows that the presidential approval 
rating for neither Chile nor Bolivia are statistically significant regarding the timing of 
relevant tweets. In other words, the percent of relevant tweets does not have any 
correlation to the presidential approval data. Therefore, the approval rating for both 
countries is irrelevant in regards to when Bolivians chose to tweet about the sea.  
What is important, however, is the Bolivian “Day of the Sea.” In the month of 
March, which is when the Bolivians celebrate the holiday, the percent of tweets that talk 
about the ocean or the land dispute increases by about 20 percentage points. This is 
statistically significant, and shows that Bolivians are especially acknowledging their loss 
of the “Litoral” during this time period. One reasoning for the increase of tweets about 
the land dispute during the month of March is simply the fact that it is a month of 
commemoration, and therefore requires special attention to the dispute, just as in the 
United States, our media coverage of the War on Terror increases during the month of 
September.  
Although the presidential approval rating alone is not, on average, statistically 
correlated showing increasing volume of tweets about the land dispute for Bolivia, 
however, the “Day of the Sea” variable is a moderating factor. Figure 5 shows that when 
Evo’s approval rating is low, and it is the month of the “Day of the Sea,” he tweets about 
the “mar” more frequently than when he has high approval rating. The drastic increase in 
tweeting about the sea only during the month of March and when Evo has low approval 
                                                      
1 See Appendix, Figure B, for summary of Regression Statistics  
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rating directly relates to the “diversionary use of force” theory which states that often 
times a trigger, or an excuse, is needed to cause the “rally-round-the-flag” effect. In this 
case, the “day of the sea” is utilized as the trigger which causes the frequency of tweets 
about the sea to increase, and therefore produces a rally effect on the population, and 
boosts presidential approval rating.  
Figure 4 and 5 are directly related because both show that when Evo has 
abnormally low approval ratings in the month of March, the Bolivian accounts tweet even 
more about the land dispute (when compared to a month of March in which Evo has 
higher approval ratings). Evo’s lowest points of approval during the month of March in 
which a key event occurred for the trial all combined to make an effective rally setting for 
Bolivia.  
 
Comparing Bolivia Internationally  
 I also looked at how often Evo Morales tweets about other international interests 
so that I could have a basis to see if there is a discernable pattern of bringing up other 
issues. About 12.4% of all of Evo’s tweets contained the terms “EEUU” or “Estados 
Unidos,” but only about 3.4% of his tweets mentioned both “EEUU” AND “Bolivia.” 
Evo tweets about what is happening in other countries, but when it comes to mentioning 
international relations between his country and the United States, it consumes less than 
4% of his total tweets. He has also only tweeted about China 43 times, respectively 0.4% 
of his tweets over the last three years. It is evident that Evo is largely more concerned 
with international relations with Chile than with other countries because about 6.4% of 
Evo’s total tweets discussed the land dispute with Chile. Chile “stealing” Bolivia’s sea 
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can be seen as a sensitive subject for many Bolivians,  which is what makes it a hot-topic 
within the country, and enlarges its capacity to be a trigger for the “rally-round-the-flag” 
effect. 
Another aspect that contributes to the “rally-round-the-flag” effect is the lack of 
coverage of conflicting opinions about an international dispute because the media only 
has access to what the government releases. In the case of the land dispute between Chile 
and Bolivia, Pagina Siete tweeted most about the land dispute in March 2017 (3%), when 
Bolivia delivered their response letter to Chile in the Hague, March 2018 (10%), when 
the court held public hearings, September 2018 (5%) and October 2018 (6%) when the 
press releases for the final decision were being released. In total, 2.4% of Pagina Siete’s 
tweets contained the word “Chile,” but only 1.5% of their total tweets (1,234 out of the 
82,374 tweets) since January 2017 were relevant regarding the land dispute. They have 
tweeted about “EEUU” or “Estados Unidos,” 1.77% of the time, and “China” 0.68% 
(only 564 times). Venezuela, which is a country that has been very prevalent in the media 
in recent years, only consumes 1.3% of Pagina Siete’s tweets. Comparing these four 
countries from this Bolivian newspaper, “Chile” is tweeted about more frequently than 
“China,” the “United States,” and “Venezuela.”  Pagina Siete has lower percentages 
overall due to their mass volume of tweets, from January 2017 until December 2018 they 
tweeted 82,374 times, which averages out to be about 3,432 tweets per month.  
The fact that Chile has consumed over 2% of this Bolivian newspaper’s tweets, 
and up to 10% in a given month, is noteworthy in that a portion of their media coverage 
is being dedicated solely to Chile, which is more than any other country.2 This can be tied 
                                                      
2 Percentage of Pagina Siete’s tweets dedicated to other neighboring countries: Argentina= 1%; 
Brasil=1.2%; Uruguay= 0.25%; Peru= 0.2%; and Paraguay= 0.2% 
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to the opinion leadership explanation for the “rally-round-the-flag” effect in that the 
media coverage of a “crisis” tends to follow the opinion and coverage of the President.  
A bivariate correlation using Evo’s number of relevant tweets per month as the 
independent variable, and Pagina Siete’s number of relevant tweets per month as the 
dependent variable from December 2016 through November 2018 provides a goodness of 
fit, r= .916. This means that as Evo increases coverage of the land dispute, Pagina Siete 
increases coverage as well. This also corresponds to the opinion leadership explanation 
for the rally effect in that Evo’s coverage directly influences the media to dedicate more 
attention to the land dispute as well. It is even more meaningful because Pagina Siete has 
the reputation of being critical of the government, and because Pagina Siete is following 
Evo’s coverage and opinion regarding the land dispute we can assume that the media is 
aiding Evo in creating a rally effect to boost his approval ratings at key moments.  
An interesting person to analyze for Bolivia is Carlos Mesa. Carlos Mesa was 
President of Bolivia from 2002-2005 before Evo Morales, he was also chosen to 
represent Bolivia in the Hague because of his extensive knowledge about the Bolivian sea 
(Alanoca 2018). It also recently came out that he is planning to run against Evo Morales 
in the upcoming election (Nova 2018). Only 4% of all of Carlos Mesa’s tweets were with 
regards to the sea, most of which were propaganda about his book “El Libro del Mar,” 
which was published and distributed by the Bolivian government, however there was no 
correlation found between his tweets and presidential approval rating nor were the timing 
of his tweets necessarily relevant. 
A more interesting  person to analyze for Bolivia other than Carlos Mesa is Diego 
Pary who was the Bolivian Ambassador in the Organization of American States, and was 
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elected as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia in September 2018 (Blanco 2018). 
He averages about 14% of his tweets which discuss the sea and the land dispute against 
Chile, which is almost twice as much as every other Bolivian account, except the official 
Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations account, which averages about 12% of their 
tweets regarding the land dispute. Pary’s clear focus, especially around the decision of 
the Hague, is about Bolivian relations with Chile and access to the sea. As the Minister of 
Bolivian Foreign Affairs, the fact that he is dedicating a good portion of his tweets to 
discussing Chile indicates that Chile is the main concern of the ministry, which is also 
demonstrated by the large amount of tweets that the official account tweets.  
 
The Chilean Perspective  
 The Chilean analysis corresponds almost directly to my hypothesis that the land 
dispute is seemingly irrelevant to Chilean elites. Figure 1 shows almost no relationship 
between the percent of relevant tweets about the land dispute and the presidential 
approval rating. However, the panel regression for all Chilean accounts shows that there 
is a relationship between the Bolivian “Day of the Sea” and the frequency of which 
Chilean accounts tweet about the sea. Chilean accounts tweeted about 5 percentage points 
more during the month of March about the land dispute than they did the rest of the year. 
March is the Bolivian celebration of “day of the sea,” so why then, does Chile care? 
 During March, Bolivian elites are trying very hard to make the issue of the sea a 
more known and relevant phenomenon. In return, Chilean elites respond to this influx of 
tweets with their own increase of tweets about the sea as a form of reaction, however 
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Chileans tweet approximately 20% less about the land dispute than Bolivians do during 
the month of March 
 There is also a slight increase in tweets from the Chilean accounts when the 
Bolivian approval rates increase. There is a statistically significant correlation between an 
increase in Chileans tweeting about the sea and an upsurge in the approval rating of Evo 
Morales in Bolivia. Chileans tweet about 1% more regarding the sea and the land dispute 
when Evo has higher approval ratings. I do not have an explanation for this increase of 
coverage.  
Sebastian Piñera, the Chilean President from 2010 until 2014 and again in 2018, 
also tweets significantly more about the land dispute around the court case.3 Actually, the 
first time Piñera mentioned Bolivia or the land dispute was in April 2013, when Bolivia 
filed against Chile. Piñera held power during the onset of the court case, and then again at 
the end of the court case when the decision was presented. Piñera’s largest amount of 
tweets regarding the land dispute, 15%, occurred in May 2015 when he was not in the 
Presidential role, but corresponded to the public hearings being presented in the Hague. 
Only about 1.5% of Piñera’s total tweets were about the land dispute, which is four times 
less than that of Evo Morales’. Additionally, only 1.1% of Piñera’s tweets contained the 
term, “Bolivia,” which is considerably less than 6% of Evo’s tweets containing “Chile.”  
Michelle Bachelet was the President of Chile from 2014-2018, unlike Piñera, she 
does not have a very active Twitter presence. She has only tweeted a total of  620 times 
since she created her account 2015. Bachelet has also only mentioned the land dispute 
one time, equating about 0.2% of her tweets. Her one and only tweet about Bolivia or the 
                                                      
3 Appendix, Figure E, is a graph of Chilean Presidential Approval rating and the tweets from the Presidents 
  47 
land dispute was published on March 21, 2018, Bolivian “Day of the Sea,” but it occurred 
outside the realm of her Presidency.  
Both Chilean presidents who held power during the time frame of the court case 
did not tweet a substantial amount until the end of the case. Piñera held power at this 
time, so his tweets were relevant with regards to communicating with his country, but 
Bachelet’s single tweet is seemingly irrelevant except that it does occur on Bolivian “Day 
of the Sea.” 
Looking at how frequently Piñera mentions other countries with whom Chile has 
a relationship with, only 0.52% of Piñera’s tweets contained the terms “EEUU” or 
“Estados Unidos,” that is only 17 tweets out of his 3,282 tweets that I have scraped. 
Similarly, Piñera has only tweeted 18 times about “Argentina,” which is about 0.55% of 
his tweets. The tweets about the United States and about Argentina both account for 
about 1% fewer tweets than he dedicates to the land dispute, both countries mentioned 
combined are fewer than Piñera’s tweets about Bolivia, which occur about twice as often 
as the tweets about Argentina and the United States. In total, Piñera tweets about the land 
dispute 48 times (1.5% of his tweets), which is not, by any means, a considerable portion 
of his tweets. But, similar to Evo, Piñera does tweet more about Bolivia than he does 
other countries. 
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Figure 6: 
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however, unless it’s a major event, El Mercurio remains largely unconcerned with this 
dispute.  
By analyzing “El Mercurio’s” tweets that mention other countries that Chile 
engages in international relations with, we see that Bolivia is mentioned slightly more 
than some countries, but slightly less than others. For example: “Bolivia” is mentioned 
208 times out of 39,535 tweets from the past two years, which is about 0.53% of El 
Mercurio’s tweets, but the land dispute is discussed about 0.69% of the time. “EEUU” or 
“Estados Unidos” is mentioned 134 times or 0.33% of their tweets, and “Perú” consumes 
only 0.41% of their  tweets.  “Argentina” and “China” are mentioned 268 times (0.68% 
of the time) and 271 times (0.69%) respectively. The two foreign countries mentioned 
most frequently are “Brasil” who is mentioned 0.75% of the time, and “Venezuela” 
which accounts for 0.79% of El Mercurio’s tweets.  
 In summary, the USA and Peru are mentioned less frequently than Bolivia, while 
on the other hand, Argentina and China are mentioned more than Bolivia but about the 
same amount as the land dispute, and Brazil and Venezuela are each mentioned about 
145% more frequently than Bolivia. For a comparative figure, El Mercurio mentions 
“Chile” in about 8.5% of their tweets, so while all of the foreign countries combined 
make up less than 5% of their tweets, it can be interpreted that El Mercurio doesn’t 
necessarily cover foreign affairs as frequently as it does domestic. In contrast to the 
Bolivian newspaper- Pagina Siete, El Mercurio tweets half as frequently as Pagina Siete 
in general, and half as frequently about international affairs. 
The ministry of foreign relations account for Chile, on average, tweets about the 
land dispute 3.5% of the time. When compared to the Bolivian ministry of foreign affairs 
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official account, which tweets about the land dispute, on average, 12% of the time, the 
Chilean ministry tweets, on average, about 343% less than the Bolivian ministry. It is 
evident that the Chilean ministry of foreign affairs is indifferent towards Bolivia who is 
not their main concern internationally. If you take out March 2018 as an outlier (because 
it has twice the amount of tweets as any other month), the Chilean ministry of foreign 
affairs account only tweets about the land dispute, on average, 2.6% of the time. While 
Chile remains a key topic for the Bolivian ministry of foreign affairs, Chile is largely 
ambivalent when it comes to their relations with Bolivia, which is fairly obvious 
considering the how infrequently they discuss the land dispute  
 In summary, the frequency of tweets from the Chilean Twitter accounts that are 
most likely to tweet about the land dispute are drastically lower than their Bolivian 
counterparts. The Chilean elites have an indifferent attitude towards Bolivia, which is 
evident in the amount of tweets they dedicate to discussing the dispute, which is hardly 
any. Bolivia, on the other hand, commit a substantial amount of their tweets to discussing 
the land dispute against Chile.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION   
Before conducting a content analysis of Tweets from various Chilean and 
Bolivian sources, I hypothesized that while Bolivian politicians use the land dispute as a 
diversionary tool, the Chileans tend to remain largely unconcerned about it. Essentially, I 
had two hypotheses about each respective country in order to make a comparison about 
how each country has handled the seemingly never-ending land dispute, so I will first 
draw separate conclusion and finally, I will draw a comparative conclusion.  
 
Bolivia- Dispute as a Political Tool?  
 Does Bolivia use the land dispute against Chile as a political tool to rally the 
country in support of the president? Primarily, in order to understand how the dispute 
could be used as a political tool, it is imperative to understand that part of the collective 
Bolivian identity is inherently related to geography, and that the long term effects of the 
War of the Pacific and “the lost provinces of Bolivia are at the heart of the collective 
memory and the coastline is the most significant to them” (Laetitia 2013). Therefore, 
references to the land dispute can be understand as a direct call to Bolivian nationalism, 
and can then be analyzed as a political tool. It is also important to note that in 2011, when 
Evo first established the resurgence of the coastal claim, it came after Evo’s first 
interaction with Bolivian opposition to the government in the form of strikes and 
overwhelming public disapproval. 
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When analyzing just the correlation between the presidential approval rating and the 
percentage of tweets about the land dispute, there is no significant relationship. However, 
when the time of the year is factored in, it becomes evident that the land dispute is used 
as a rally tool for the Bolivian government. For example, during the month of March, the 
month of the celebrations of the “Day of the Sea”, when Evo has low approval ratings, 
the percentage of Bolivian tweets regarding the land dispute is significantly increased. If 
we analyze the use of tweets as a measure of increased communication about the land 
dispute, and examine the time frame in which the frequency of tweets increases, it 
becomes apparent that the Day of the Sea and, on a smaller scale- the court case, are 
being utilized as a trigger point to increase discussion about the conflict with Chile, and 
in turn, create a rally effect to boost Evo’s popularity rating. For example, the 
celebrations of the Day of the Sea inadvertently sparks the country’s interest in the sea, 
Evo then increases his media coverage of the dispute, giving the impression that Evo is 
fighting more than ever to get their sea back, which causes his approval rating to 
increase.  
The Bolivian accounts follow this pattern for other dates too. As important proceedings, 
hearings, or deliberations occurred within the Hague regarding the court case between 
Chile and Bolivia, the percent of relevant tweets about the land dispute drastically 
increased as well. Chile is also discussed a lot more frequently by the Bolivian accounts 
than any other country. By appealing to part of the Bolivian identity and invoking a call 
to nationalism, the land dispute and the disdain against Chile can be seen as a minor crisis 
that politicians utilize to garner approval, technically known as the “rally-round-the-flag” 
effect.  
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The “rally-round-the-flag” effect is also demonstrated by the media coverage of the 
Bolivian newspaper, Pagina Siete, which is consistent with the opinion leadership school 
of thought as to what causes the rally effect. An increase of Evo’s tweets about the land 
dispute is directly correlated to an increase in tweets about the land dispute from Pagina 
Siete. Effectively, this means that because Evo and the news outlets are communicating 
together about the land dispute, it becomes even more saturated in the media, which 
causes a rally effect because the people are only seeing positive media coverage about 
Evo’s involvement in the dispute, which is what the people want to see. 
In summary, while there is not sufficient statistical evidence to demonstrate a direct 
correlation between presidential approval and an increase of media coverage surrounding 
the land dispute for Bolivia, there is evidence to demonstrate that the capacity for the land 
dispute to be used as a rally tool does exist. Low approval ratings in the month of March 
directly correlates to an increase of tweets about the land dispute, giving evidence that the 
land dispute is being used as a method to increase Evo’s approval rating. The resurgence 
of the land dispute in 2011 and an increase of coverage during the court case can both 
demonstrate the use of the dispute as a political tool because of the time periods in which 
they occur.  
 
Chile- ambivalent to Bolivian demands?  
 Does Chile really not care about Bolivia’s demands for “their sea” back? I find 
this to be largely true. With exception to the major dates for the court case, the Chilean 
twitter accounts remain largely unconcerned with Bolivia and their demands.  
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 The Chilean accounts increase their media coverage about the dispute around two 
occasions. First, Chileans increase discussion about the land dispute around the Bolivian 
“day of the sea,” which is a direct response by the Chileans to the large surge of tweets 
by the Bolivians about the their demands during the month of March. Second, coverage is 
increased during important court case dates, (El Mercurio doesn’t tweet about the dispute 
outside of the court case) which is an expected response to being sued in the Hague, and 
keeping your population informed.  
 Comparing media coverage of other countries by Chile, Bolivia is discussed 
equally to other countries including the United States, China, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Venezuela. This means that although Chile and Bolivia have been undergoing an intense 
court case, Chile doesn’t discuss Bolivia any more than it does other countries.  
 
Comparative Conclusion  
Bolivia addresses the land dispute considerably more than Chile does, 350% more 
to be exact. The Chilean President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs address the land 
dispute less than 1/3 of the time of their Bolivian counterparts. There is not sufficient 
evidence that there is a correlation between the coverage of the land dispute and 
presidential approval ratings for either country to assume a direct “rally-round-the-flag” 
effect. The Bolivians do, however, use the dispute more frequently and efficiently, 
especially compared to the Chileans who do not use the dispute for any political gain. 
While my hypothesis regarding Bolivia was not completely correct, it was correct 
for Chile. For Bolivia, the evidence suggested that the land dispute has been utilized as a 
rally tool during time periods when presidential approval is low and the environment 
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within the country is already largely concentrated on the land dispute. For Chile, the 
dispute is never used as a political tool within the country, largely due to the fact that 
Chileans simply do not care about the dispute.  
The use of Twitter as data was innovative yet had its downfalls. Twitter now 
allows for a method of direct communication with the public, which enables it to be 
analyzed as a direct reflection of the political tactics and goals that the politicians are 
trying to engage. Because Twitter is so new, it does not allow for a large amount of 
historical data. For example, I suspect that if Evo Morales had a Twitter account in 2010, 
the correlation between low approval rating and an increase in tweets regarding the land 
dispute would have been statistically significant, however the data from Twitter does not 
allow that.  
Moving forward, I believe that the use of Twitter to analyze politicians can be 
extensively used, especially among a certain class of politicians. For example, the current 
political environments in the United States, Venezuela, and Mexico all which have 
hostile environments (some more than others) as caused by their largely populist leaders.  
 Finally, in my opinion, the Twitter environment is the perfect catalyst for the 
“rally-round-the-flag” effect due to its potential to reach large masses of the population, 
and serve as a direct reflection of one’s own personal thoughts and opinions. By 
analyzing the rally effect in a different mode and region from the typical diversionary 
literature, I was able to draw unique conclusions with statistical evidence to something 
that has not been extensively studied before, especially within the Bolivian case. As the 
use of Twitter and other social media platforms continue to develop, so will the literature 
of the limitless potential of utilizing it as a political tool.   
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APPENDIX: 
Figure A: 
 
Figure B: Regression Statistics for Bolivia   
4 
Figure C: Regression Statistics for Chile  
5 
 
                                                      
4 Love, Gregory. Panel Regression with an AR1 Correction. For the Bolivian Twitter feeds. 
5 Love, Gregory. Panel Regression with an AR1 Correction. For the Chilean Twitter feeds. 
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Figure D:  
 
Figure E: 
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